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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 13-2212 
____________ 
 
R.K. and D.K., individually, and on behalf of R.K., 
 
  Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CLIFTON BOARD OF EDUCATION          
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 2:11-cv-06231) 
District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  October 8, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 R.K. and D.K., individually and on behalf of their son R.K. (collectively, “the 
plaintiffs”), appeal the District Court’s March 28, 2013 order granting the Clifton Board 
of Education (“the District”) summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleging 
violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and denying the 
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plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record.  The order effectively affirmed the decision 
of a New Jersey administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denying the plaintiffs’ petition for 
relief.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.         
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts that are necessary 
to our disposition.  R.K. was diagnosed with autism when he was two years old.  R.K., 
his parents, and his sister lived in Clifton, New Jersey at all times relevant to this opinion.  
When R.K. was three years old, the District classified R.K. as eligible for special 
education services.  On July 27, 2007, the District proposed an Individual Education Plan 
(“IEP”) for R.K.  However, R.K.’s parents disagreed with the proposed IEP, and on 
September 11, 2007, filed a due process hearing petition challenging the proposed IEP 
and seeking specific services for R.K.
1
  Pending resolution of the petition, the plaintiffs 
arranged and paid for R.K.’s educational program through Progressive Steps, a State-
approved early intervention services provider.  Around this time, the plaintiffs also 
learned about the Carbone Clinic,
2
 a private clinic located in New York, and arranged for 
an assessment of R.K.  The plaintiffs applied, and R.K. was placed on the Carbone 
Clinic’s waiting list.   
                                              
1
 The plaintiffs specifically requested an “ABA/AVB program, ABA instruction at school 
and at home, a 1:1 aide trained in ABA and the support of a certified behaviorist.”  
Appendix (“App.”) 54.  “ABA” stands for Applied Behavior Analysis and “AVB” stands 
for Applied Verbal Behavior, a subset of ABA that is related specifically to language 
development.     
2
 The Carbone Clinic is not a school, and is not approved by the New York or New Jersey 
Department of Education.   
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 On March 20, 2008, the plaintiffs and the District reached a stipulated settlement 
of the plaintiffs’ petition, and the District agreed that it would provide, inter alia, 20 hours 
per week of direct one-to-one ABA/AVB instruction through Progressive Steps.  The 
District also agreed to transition R.K. gradually and fully into a full-day AVB preschool 
disabled class by September 2008.  The settlement stipulated that the parties would 
convene an IEP meeting prior to the 2008-2009 year to “determine appropriate 
accommodations, the need for further 1:1 ABA and other related services.”  App. 56.   
 The IEP meeting took place on August 11, 2008, at which the District’s Child 
Study Team (“CST”) set forth an IEP that placed R.K. in the full-day program and gave 
him related services, including ABA and AVB services provided by Progressive Steps.  
The plaintiffs attended this meeting, but deny signing the IEP.  In accordance with the 
settlement and IEP, R.K. started full-time in a class taught by Ilene Platkin in September 
2008, and continued to receive 20 hours per week of one-to-one ABA/AVB services from 
Progressive Steps.  R.K. attended the class from September 2008 to February 2009.  At 
the due process petition hearing before the ALJ, several witnesses testified that R.K. 
made at least reasonable progress in the program during this time.    
 By November 2008, the plaintiffs learned that the District had retained Dr. Irene 
Cook, a consultant and Board Certified Behavior Analyst, to review its AVB program.  
The plaintiffs requested a copy of the report prepared by Dr. Cook following her 
observation of the program (the “Cook Report”), but the District denied the request.   
 On January 19, 2009, R.K. was accepted to the Carbone Clinic.  The next day, the 
plaintiffs notified the District of R.K.’s acceptance to the clinic, and requested an IEP 
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meeting to discuss changes to R.K.’s program.  The plaintiffs followed up with another 
letter on January 23, 2009, expressing concerns about R.K.’s current program and 
requesting a meeting to discuss placement of R.K. at the Carbone Clinic in the mornings.  
In response, the District convened another IEP meeting on February 3, 2009.  At the 
meeting, the District advised the plaintiffs that it would have to reevaluate R.K. because 
he had aged out of his class, and also that it would have to assess the Carbone Clinic 
before it could respond to the plaintiffs’ request.  The plaintiffs informed the District that 
starting February 9, 2009, they planned to send R.K. to the Carbone Clinic three 
mornings per week, and then for five mornings starting March 1.  They proceeded to start 
R.K. at the Carbone Clinic on this schedule.  
 The CST completed a reevaluation of R.K. and an observation of the Carbone 
Clinic, and met with the plaintiffs again on April 23, 2009.  At the meeting, the District 
denied the plaintiffs’ request that R.K. attend the Carbone Clinic in the mornings and 
instead proposed that beginning May 8, 2009, R.K. be placed full-time in Platkin’s 
preschool disabled AVB class and, for the 2009-2010 school year, in a kindergarten AVB 
class for children with autism.  The District included these terms in a draft IEP, which 
was provided to the plaintiffs.   
 On May 7, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second due process petition claiming that 
R.K. was being denied an IDEA-guaranteed free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) 
during the 2008-2009 school year.  The plaintiffs’ petition also challenged the April 23, 
2009 IEP proposal for the 2009-2010 school year, and sought services, including 
placement at the Carbone Clinic and reimbursement for costs.  
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 In or around June 2009, in preparation for the due process hearing, the plaintiffs 
requested that an expert be permitted to observe Platkin’s classroom.  The District denied 
this request on June 11, 2009.     
 On July 26, 2011, after 16 days of hearings, the ALJ held that the 2008-2009 
program and the 2009-2010 IEP provided R.K. a FAPE.  The plaintiffs brought suit in the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey to appeal the ALJ’s decision, alleging 
violations of the IDEA, New Jersey’s special education law, and Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and the 
District Court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment on March 28, 2013.   
 The plaintiffs also moved to supplement the record, requesting that the District 
Court admit the Cook Report, Dr. Cook’s deposition testimony, and exhibits.  The 
District Court denied the motion, finding that the Cook Report was not “necessarily 
useful in assessing whether [the ALJ] properly determined that the District’s IEPs for 
R.K. were appropriate.”  App. 27-28.  The District Court observed that Dr. Cook never 
met R.K. or reviewed any documents related to R.K., and that other witnesses at the due 
process hearing had testified as to their observations of the District’s ABA/AVB 
program.  The court also concluded “that the District’s denial of plaintiffs’ request to get 
a copy of Dr. Cook’s report did not violate plaintiffs’ procedural rights under IDEA such 
that R.K.’s right to a FAPE was impeded.”  App. 29.  The District Court further held that 
the District’s refusal to allow the plaintiffs’ expert to observe Platkin’s class did not 
violate the plaintiffs’ procedural rights because “access was not improperly denied and 
the opportunity to observe the class was sufficiently available to plaintiffs.”  Id.    
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 The plaintiffs timely appealed, arguing that:  (1) the District Court abused its 
discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record; and (2) the District 
Court erred in concluding that the District had not denied R.K. of a FAPE by violating 
plaintiffs’ procedural rights.3          
II. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s conclusions of law and 
application of legal standards under the IDEA.  See Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 
260, 268 (3d Cir. 2010).  We “review the District Court’s findings of fact . . . under a 
clearly erroneous standard.”  Id.   
 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  See Susan 
N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 1995).   
III. 
A. 
 The plaintiffs assert that the District Court erred in finding that the District did not 
deny R.K. a FAPE by violating the plaintiffs’ procedural rights under the IDEA.  
Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that their procedural rights were violated by the 
                                              
3
 The plaintiffs also assert that the District Court erred in holding that they failed to 
comply with Local Civil Rule 56.1 by failing to file a statement of undisputed material 
facts with their cross-motion for summary judgment.  Because the District Court did not 
dismiss plaintiffs’ motion on this basis, but rather addressed the merits of plaintiffs’ 
arguments, it is not necessary for us to reach this argument.     
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District’s refusal to both provide them a copy of the Cook Report and allow their expert 
to observe Platkin’s class in preparation for the due process hearing.   
 Congress passed the IDEA to “ensure that all children with disabilities have 
available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education 
and related services designed to meet their unique needs. . . .”  20 U.S.C. § 
1400(d)(1)(A).  The IDEA “specifies that the education the states provide to [children 
with disabilities] specially [be] designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped 
child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from the 
instruction.”  D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation 
marks omitted).  These services are usually designed and implemented through an IEP, 
which is a program of individualized instruction for each special education student.  See 
id. at 557.  If parents “believe that an IEP fails to provide their child with a free and 
appropriate public education, they may challenge the IEP in an administrative 
proceeding.”  Id.  However, if parents allege a procedural, rather than substantive, 
violation of the IDEA, such a violation is actionable only if it “results in a loss of 
educational opportunity for the student, seriously deprives the parents of their 
participation rights, or causes a deprivation of educational benefits.”  Id. at 565. 
 The plaintiffs assert that the District’s refusal to give them a copy of the Cook 
Report violated the procedural rights guaranteed by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), which 
provides that parents of a child with a disability shall have an opportunity to, inter alia, 
“examine all records relating to [their] child.”  We first note that there is no evidence in 
the record indicating that the Cook Report “relates” to R.K., as the Cook Report 
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addressed the District’s program generally and Dr. Cook never met R.K. nor reviewed 
any documents pertaining to R.K.  Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiffs’ procedural 
right to examine all records relating to R.K. has not been violated.   
 However, even assuming the plaintiffs’ procedural rights were violated, there is no 
indication that this procedural violation resulted in an actionable deprivation of the 
plaintiffs’ participation rights, as they allege.  The plaintiffs participated in several 
meetings about R.K.’s IEPs with the District’s CST, and provided input that was 
carefully considered by the District, as reflected by the fact that the CST engaged in an 
independent assessment of the Carbone Clinic in order to evaluate the plaintiffs’ request 
to send R.K. there in the mornings.  We have held that parents who participated in and 
made suggestions at an IEP meeting had an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the 
decision-making process regarding their child’s education, despite procedural violations 
that had occurred prior to the meeting and despite the fact that not all of their suggestions 
were incorporated into the IEP.  See D.S., 602 F.3d at 565.  Accordingly, although the 
plaintiffs posit that the CST might have been more receptive to their concerns about the 
District’s autism program if those concerns had been supported by the Cook Report, the 
fact that the District’s proposed IEP did not adopt the plaintiffs’ suggestions does not 
mean that they were deprived of meaningful participation in the decision-making process 
regarding R.K.
4
            
                                              
4
 To the extent the plaintiffs also argue that their procedural right to “participate in 
meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the 
child” under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) was violated by the District’s failure to provide them 
a copy of the Cook Report, this argument fails for the reasons stated above.    
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 The plaintiffs also assert that the District’s refusal to allow their expert to observe 
Platkin’s class violated their right to an impartial due process hearing under 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(f)(1)(A).  They note that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h) provides for parents’ “right to be 
accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or 
training with respect to the problems of children with disabilities” and “right to present 
evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses.”  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1), (2).  Once again, we do not believe that the record reflects a 
violation of these procedural rights.  The ALJ held an extensive hearing, during which the 
plaintiffs presented testimony from a number of witnesses, both lay and expert.  The 
plaintiffs do not allege that they were denied counsel or prevented from cross-examining 
the District’s witnesses or presenting their own; rather, they appear to assert that the 
inability to present an additional expert witness deprived them of their right to an 
impartial due process hearing.  We do not find this argument persuasive.
5
   
 However, even assuming a procedural due process violation, we once again hold, 
for the reasons stated above, that the District’s refusal to allow the plaintiffs’ expert 
access to Platkin’s class did not deprive the plaintiffs of their right to participate in the 
decision-making process regarding R.K.’s education.  On the contrary, the plaintiffs 
                                              
5
 The plaintiffs also appear to argue that the refusal to allow their expert to observe the 
District’s proposed program violates their procedural right to an “independent 
educational evaluation” under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1).  However, the plaintiffs do not 
quote the relevant clause of the statute in its entirety.  The section provides that a parent 
is entitled to an opportunity to “obtain an independent educational evaluation of the 
child.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (emphasis added).  Observation of the proposed program 
while R.K. is not in attendance does not implicate this procedural right.         
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participated meaningfully in the process, had their concerns considered by the CST, and 
had the ultimate decision carefully reviewed by an ALJ after extensive testimony.       
B. 
 The plaintiffs also argue that the District Court abused its discretion in declining to 
supplement the record with the Cook Report and evidence of the District’s refusal to 
allow the plaintiffs’ expert to observe Platkin’s class.6  The IDEA permits a party to 
request that the court “hear additional evidence” beyond that which was admitted at the 
administrative hearing.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(C).  A district court must “exercise 
particularized discretion in its rulings so that it will consider evidence relevant, 
noncumulative and useful in determining whether Congress’ goal has been reached for 
the child involved.”  Susan N., 70 F.3d at 760.   
 As stated above, the Cook Report is not particularly relevant or useful, as it does 
not address or concern R.K. in any way.  Similarly, evidence of the fact that the District 
Court denied access to a particular expert of the plaintiffs’ in June of 2009 would not be 
at all useful to determining whether R.K.’s specific education needs were being met, but 
rather would serve only potentially to prejudice the factfinder against the District.  
                                              
6
 The plaintiffs assert that the District Court failed to consider the relevance of the 
proffered evidence to their procedural claims, focusing only on their substantive claims.  
This argument is unpersuasive in light of the fact that, although much of the District 
Court’s analysis focused on the relevance of the Cook Report to the plaintiffs’ 
substantive FAPE claims, the court explicitly held that the failure to provide the Cook 
Report and the denial of access to the plaintiffs’ expert did not violate plaintiffs’ 
procedural rights under the IDEA.  See App. 29.  For the reasons stated above, we agree 
with the District Court’s holding.     
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Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record.  
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.     
